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The shared experience of DOS and DoD personnel deployed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq has increased our mutual understand-
ing of the missions of the two departments. While the culture 
of the organizations may differ, we have much more in com-
mon than there are differences. Additionally, different per-
spectives can help us understand each other while we are often 
working in overlapping operational spaces around the world.
JOURNAL: What initially attracted you to work at 
PM/WRA?
BROWN: I liked the work that the State Department ac-
complishes around the world, but for most of my career in the 
Air Force, including my previous assignments at DOS, I was 
focused on operational issues. PM/WRA has a very impor-
tant humanitarian and national security mission where we are 
able to see the immediate impact of our conventional weap-
ons-destruction programs. Whether it is humanitarian mine 
action that encompasses demining, survivor assistance and 
mine risk education, or curbing the proliferation of at-risk 
small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) including man- 
portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), PM/WRA’s 
mission helps civilian communities rebuild after conflict. 
Additionally, PM/WRA’s staff has a great reputation, and it 
is evident that the mission has a positive impact on the over-
all team.
JOURNAL: Based on your experiences, are there any is-
sues that PM/WRA addresses that seem particularly ur-
gent to you? Have you faced challenges from the illicit 
proliferation of conventional weapons or seen their re-
percussions firsthand?
BROWN: Humanitarian mine action is still extreme-
ly important because of the impact that it has on civilian 
populations. However, increasingly the illicit prolifera-
tion of SA/LW, including MANPADS, is having a significant 
impact in regional conflicts. As a pilot in the Air Force fly-
ing large cargo aircraft in conflict areas, we consistently em-
ployed tactics to reduce the threat posed by SA/LW including 
MANPADS. I trained for and saw this threat firsthand as I 
flew combat missions in Afghanistan.
JOURNAL: What do you believe will be your biggest chal-
lenge as the new director of PM/WRA?
BROWN: While PM/WRA funding has remained rela-
tively stable over time, there has been a decrease in funding 
for conventional weapons-destruction programs overall. We 
must continue to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars and 
ensure that the programs we support will have the largest 
impact on society and support our national security priori-
ties. Close coordination with our U.S. interagency partners, 
such as DoD and USAID, our implementing partners, donor 
countries, affected states, and international and regional or-
ganizations such as the U.N. and Organization of American 
States is an essential part of this approach. This enables us to 
facilitate the most effective and efficient delivery of assistance 
with a flexible approach that is responsive to rapidly changing 
situations.
JOURNAL: What do you believe are some of the most sig-
nificant challenges PM/WRA currently faces? In what re-
gions of the world do these challenges occur?
BROWN: One of the biggest challenges that PM/WRA is 
facing is the proliferation of SA/LW in Africa following the 
conflict in Libya where much of the weapons have fallen out of 
government control. Our focus is to join with partners in the 
region to help stem the flow of these weapons and keep them 
out of the hands of those who would harm civilians or threaten 
our national security.
JOURNAL: How important is empowering local popula-
tions to handle their own mine action, explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) and SA/LW issues? How does PM/
WRA do this?
BROWN: It is extremely important for local populations 
to take responsibility for their own mine action, ERW and 
SA/LW issues. PM/WRA facilitates this participation by en-
couraging countries to develop the expertise to manage these 
issues and share the cost of humanitarian mine action activ-
ities. Additionally, PM/WRA, through implementing part-
ners, encourages programs that are self-sustaining or can be 
leveraged to help in other areas. For instance, PM/WRA used 
Bosnian mine-detection dog-training teams to train dogs and 
handlers in Northern Iraq.
JOURNAL: What parts of your work as director are you es-
pecially looking forward to? What have you enjoyed the 
most so far?
BROWN: President Obama made a strategic decision at the 
beginning of this Administration to focus on the Asia-Pacific 
region by rebalancing our engagement and resources toward 
this vital region, and I am looking forward to leading our efforts 
to assist in the cleanup of ERW and unexploded ordnance that 
dates back to World War II and Vietnam. [Moreover,] I have 
enjoyed working with a great team of enthusiastic professionals, 
including our implementing partners, who are committed to 
conventional weapons-destruction programs around the world.
JOURNAL: Would you tell us a little bit about yourself and 
how you chose to pursue a leadership role at DOS?
BROWN: I am originally from Lillington, North Carolina 
[N.C.]. Over my career, I have had four assignments to the 
Washington, D.C., area and have immensely enjoyed each 
one … traffic is another discussion. Washington, D.C., has 
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Outcome Monitoring in  
 Humanitarian Mine Action
Humanitarian mine action programs are attempting to develop better ways to monitor and docu-
ment the socioeconomic results of their programs. Lessons learned from the development and use 
of Danish Demining Group’s Impact Monitoring System provide examples of how to build or im-
prove current outcome- and impact-monitoring systems.






More than a decade ago, increased atten-tion to socioeconomic impact was seen as a quiet revolution in humanitarian 
mine action (HMA).1 Since then, the norm within 
many HMA nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 
has gradually included measuring outcomes and 
impact as part of internal program monitoring and 
evaluation. Today the question of what difference mine 
action activities have made to the local population is 
posed as commonly as questions regarding the num-
ber of square meters cleared or landmines removed.
There is a strong tradition of operational data col-
lection within mine action. However, recently it has 
been debated whether HMA NGOs have the neces-
sary capacity and skills to measure the socioeconomic 
effects of mine action.2 This debate often overlooks the fact 
that keeping outcome- and impact-monitoring systems sim-
ple is the best way to ensure that the collected data remains 
useful and relevant for operations. Sophisticated monitoring 
and evaluation systems are not necessarily what HMA actors 
need to gain an improved understanding of their programs’ 
socioeconomic outcomes and impact.
Building an Outcome and Impact-Monitoring System
In 2009 Danish Demining Group (DDG) introduced an 
internal monitoring system that systematically measures the 
outcomes and impact of its mine action operations in order to 
improve understanding of their effectiveness.3 DDG has a ded-
icated monitoring and evaluation adviser at its Copenhagen, 
Denmark, headquarters and impact-monitoring focal points 
in each country program. Before and after project implemen-
tation, data is collected through different methods, such as 
focus-group discussions and questionnaire surveys conduct-
ed with beneficiaries. DDG’s system is built around a set of 
reference indicators (as shown in Figure 1).
The organization has been on a steep learning curve. In 
2009, DDG began using a standardized approach, in which 
all DDG country programs used similar methods and tools. 
Today, DDG has a flexible approach, taking into account spe-
cific country-program needs. The following sections highlight 
lessons learned. 
Purpose of Monitoring Outcome and Impact
Before developing technical guidelines and choosing data 
handling systems, the purpose of the outcome monitoring 
system should be clearly defined in order to avoid data collec-
tion becoming a goal in itself. More often, outcome-monitor-
ing systems are built to enable stakeholder accountability or 
organizational learning. 
At DDG, the impact-monitoring system is predominately 





• Key question: Are we doing what we said we would do? 
• Examples of output reference indicators:
Number of square meters land released 
Number of items removed
Number of people sensitized with risk education 
Number of people trained 
Outcome and impact
monitoring:
Before and after project 
implementation
• Key question: Are we making a diff erence?
• Examples of outcome and impact reference indicators:
Changes in land use of released land 
Amount of released land brought into productive use, e.g., housing, 
agriculture, grazing  
Number of men and women benefi ting from released land  
Number of people who worry about accidents with mines or rem-
nants of war (feeling of safety)
Number of accidents reported 
{
Figure 1. Examples of DDG reference indicators for 
output and outcome.
Figure courtesy of DDG.
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strategic decision-making on operation effectiveness. While 
stakeholder accountability toward both local communities 
and donors is important, it has not been the main driver in the 
development of the system. The data from impact and outcome 
monitoring is used for donor reporting but often falls outside 
their formal reporting requirements. Since impact monitoring 
is conducted six months after operations have ended, 
donor reporting deadlines often pass before it is possible to 
collect and utilize data. In addition, few donors have formal 
requirements about reporting on outcome data beyond what 
is included in externally commissioned evaluations. At DDG, 
accountability toward the local communities is organized 
around the humanitarian accountability partnership and 
therefore falls under a reporting framework different from the 
impact-monitoring system.4   
Another reason for having a clearly defined purpose for 
the monitoring system is to ensure that data collection efforts 
are not duplicated within the organization. Evaluation of cur-
rent data collection should be a part of the process to define 
the monitoring system’s purpose. As a sector, mine action has 
a strong culture of collecting operational data, and national 
authorities and NGOs spend many resources to collect output 
data. With an overview of systems and processes in place, the 
new system will more easily integrate into existing structures. 
Use of Collected Data
Of equal importance to knowing the system’s purpose is 
having a clearly articulated procedure for how the system’s in-
formation feeds into the organization’s decision-making pro-
cesses. At DDG, the impact- and outcome-monitoring data 
go into the yearly planning cycle as shown in Figure 2. Find-
ings from the outcome and impact data then feed into strategic 
decision-making processes at annual management meetings. 
In the field, operational staff are likely to have different 
needs for the system than program-management staff. On one 
hand, the system needs to produce data relevant to daily op-
erations and sensitive to on-site situations. On the other hand, 
the system also needs to produce data that can be aggregated 
at a global level. Hence, the system has to have a degree of flex-
ibility, which can be difficult to manage. Deciding which pro-
cedures and practices are mandatory and which are optional is 
essential, e.g., data collection methods, data storage and han-
dling practices, etc., becomes critical.5 
Since 2009 DDG has moved from a generic to a toolbox ap-
proach. Each country program can choose the approach that 
best fits its specific resources and needs within the boundar-
ies of an overall framework set out by an impact-monitoring 
manual and key reference outcome and impact indicators.
Training and System Maintenance
However simple an outcome-monitoring system is, it is 
likely high maintenance. At DDG, training staff in data collec-
tion and analysis is not a one-off activity but needs revisiting 
on an annual basis. For instance, facilitation of focus-group 
Somaliland: Funnel Approach to Data Collection
When collecting data before an intervention, knowing what information will be significant over time can be a challenge. 
Initially, DDG country programs used standardized questionnaires to facilitate cross-country comparisons. In Somaliland, 
where DDG has operated since 1999, this created multiple challenges. Since it covered a wide range of topics, the questionnaire 
unavoidably provided information irrelevant to the country program. Moreover, the questionnaire was lengthy and time-
consuming, which led to the local community’s unwillingness to participate, and the data collectors became unenthusiastic. 
In response, DDG shortened the questionnaire to a more manageable length by excluding questions that did not generate 
relevant information for the specific program. Similarly, more emphasis was placed on training data collectors to use various 
participatory data collection methods that improve the expediency at which the data is collected without compromising the 



























result of the 
annual review
Figure 2. Feedback loop: information from impact- and 
outcome measurement feeds into the strategic decision- 
making process at DDG.
Figure courtesy of DDG.
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discussions—a commonly used data-collection method with-
in many NGOs—is a hugely challenging task for unskilled 
data collectors. Recently Robert Chambers, a noted develop-
ment researcher and scholar, stated that the lack of skilled 
focus-group facilitators is one of the biggest challenges to 
the quality of data collection in the field.6 This might be one 
reason why some organizations rely solely on questionnaire 
surveys and quantitative data, which often leads to a lot of in-
formation on what changes took place and very little informa-
tion on why these changes occurred. 
Additionally, HMA organizations must determine how 
much data is needed. Most organizations have a tendency to 
collect too much data and overestimate the amount of data 
they can process. DDG’s experience indicates that it is better 
to start with a few easily measurable indicators when develop-
ing a system. 
Debating the Local Effects of Mine Action
An important issue to consider is the level of socioeconomic 
effect that one can realistically expect from HMA programs. 
The effects of mine action are in many cases obvious, such 
as reducing accidents and the reduction of fear among 
populations living with the dangers of landmines and unex-
ploded ordnance. However, the broader socioeconomic effects 
or links to development are often much less assessable. There-
fore, a bit of realism is desirable when evaluating the socio-
economic effects of mine action. In many areas where DDG 
operates, populations live in chronic poverty. While most mine 
action operations leave communities safer and with opportu-
nities to become more productive, they will not ameliorate 
poverty as it can take decades for socioeconomic development 
to occur. Rather, HMA facilitates development by enabling 
local communities to be safe and control their environment 
instead of being dominated by hazardous circumstances.
When measuring mine action’s impact six months after 
clearance activities end, not all effects will have materialized. 
Sometimes, local communities need to wait for the right time 
of year to plant or to find resources to productively use more 
land. At DDG, the focus of the outcome- and impact-monitor-
ing system is on the short-term effects of land release—such as 
land-use changes and the amount of land actively used—not 
on the long-term effects in terms of increased food production 
and consumption. Therefore, the system more often measures 
outcomes than impacts of operations. 
Development takes time in places severely damaged by war such as in Sirte, Libya (2012). 
Photo courtesy of Giovanni Diffidenti.
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greater standardization and transpar-
ency. Although the terminology was 
largely maintained, the definitions were 
clarified. Figure 2 summarizes the com-
ponents of the land release process.
A two-tier system of land classifi-
cation has been promoted: Hazardous 
areas are either suspected hazardous 
areas (SHA) or confirmed hazardous 
areas (CHA) according to the availabil-
ity and quality of evidence. The classi-
fication of defined hazardous areas was 
removed, as it was not globally applica-
ble and could only be identified retro-
spectively in many cases. 
SHAs should be classified based on 
indirect evidence of contamination, 
whereas CHAs should rely on direct 
evidence. Furthermore, this evidence-
based approach discourages the creation 
of SHAs unless credible information can 
justify such a decision. This does not ex-
clude countries or organizations that 
use more complex land classification 
schemes, as long as the schemes can be 
simplified to the industry standard.
NTS, TS and clearance are the ac-
tivities used to identify mine and ERW 
contamination and return safe land to 
productive use. When applied to a haz-
ardous area, the products of these activ-
ities are measured in square meters and 
labeled cancelled, reduced or cleared 
land. In locations where no hazardous 
areas are recorded and NTS confirms 
that no suspicion exists, the result of 
the NTS should be recorded to confirm 
there is no current contamination. Yet, 
this does not result in cancelled square 
meters, because square meters can 
only be cancelled from already existing 
mapped SHA/CHAs.
The land release process prevents the 
full clearance of areas when the less ex-
pensive, more rapid NTS or TS methods 
could be employed to cancel or reduce 
land contamination. This puts greater 
SHA CHA




























Figure 2. The land release process.
emphasis on finding the best sources of 
information and identifying evidence to 
improve operational decisions and effi-
ciency. In particular, this process high-
lights the importance of high quality 
and continuous NTS activities, which 
better define where TS or clearance 
should start and how best to support 
decision-making when operations are 
underway. Where possible, a dynamic 
approach should be taken in which sur-
vey and clearance plans can be changed 
and updated as better information be-
comes available (Figure 3).
NTS should be conducted by 
trained staff who can gather and criti-
cally analyze information from a broad 
range of stakeholders in affected com-
munities and map hazardous areas 
as accurately as possible. As a guide, 
these maps can help plan clearance ac-
tivities; however, there should be leeway 
to edit, update and redraw boundaries 
of hazardous areas when more credible 
information becomes available. Work 
should be planned based on up-to-date 
information and not solely on exist-
ing maps. Where appropriate, TS can 
Figure 3. Linear versus dynamic approach to information gathering and opera-
tional adjustment.
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Effects of Mixed Teams on  
  Land Release
The Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) investigated the impact of mixed gender teams 
on land release. Based on the opinion of the respondents, as well as gender baseline assessments 
conducted by GMAP, the organization found that in most cases mixed teams in the land release 
process are primarily associated with the employment of women and its effect on the teams. Some 
mine action managers indicated that mixed teams actually enable better access to information while 
only a few respondents indicated that more accurate and inclusive information will allow mine action 
organizations to prioritize tasks where the impact is highest. This demonstrates that despite arguments 
in favor of mixed teams, their importance is still not fully understood in the mine action sector.
by Arianna Calza Bini, Nyske Janssen and Abigail Jones [ Gender and Mine Action Programme ]
Despite increasing global recognition that mixed gender teams can benefit land release, sufficient 
documentation does not exist to support 
this. In 2013 the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme (GMAP) started to map first-hand 
experiences by sending a short questionnaire 
to current and former operations, program 
and community liaison managers working in 
the field of mine action. The 10 respondents 
have worked for different international 
nongovernmental organizations in North and 
Central Africa, the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia. The respondents were invited to share 
their personal experiences from 2003–2013 
as well as opinions on the perceived impact 
of mixed gender and male teams on non-
technical survey, clearance and handover. 
In addition, findings were analyzed from seven gender 
baseline assessments involving more than 400 people. For 
these assessments, GMAP conducted individual interviews, 
focus group discussions, staff surveys and direct observation 
of local staff and expatriates in six different countries during 
2012–2013. GMAP observed that impact was most frequent-
ly interpreted as effect; hence, the results of this analysis are 
presented as effects on the individual, effects on the team and 
effects on younger and older members of impacted commu-
nities, both male and female.1,2 
Mixed Teams in Land Release
Land release in mine action focuses on operational effi-
ciency, the quality of the process and its results. Relative to a 
gender perspective, the three key steps are
•	 Hire the most qualified teams for the job
•	 Obtain information on contamination from affected 
women, girls, boys and men 
•	 Ensure the entire community is informed that released 
land is safe to use3 
HALO non-technical survey training in March 2013 in 
El Retiro, Colombia.
Photo courtesy of Grant Salisbury.
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Scalable Technical Survey for  
 Improved Land-release Rates
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) tailors technical survey (TS) to allow for more efficient use of mine 
action assets and improved land-release rates. Many organizations consider TS an isolated activity and 
fail to streamline and effectively implement TS as a tool to reduce unnecessary, time-consuming and 
costly deployment of mine action resources.
by Håvard Bach [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
Land release refers to the decision-making process be-hind identifying, defining and removing all pres-ence or suspicion of mines or explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) from an area. The basic approach to land release 
is to apply all reasonable effort to identify and subsequent-
ly release all confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) by using an 
evidence-based survey approach comprising non-technical 
survey (NTS), technical survey (TS) and clearance. CHAs are 
released when it can be confidently concluded that no mines 
are present in the area or that all mines and cluster munition 
remnants (CMR) were cleared (removed or destroyed) from 
the area. All reasonable effort describes a minimum lev-
el of effort acceptable for identifying and documenting con-
taminated areas or for removing the presence or suspicion of 
landmines and ERW. It applies to the required effort and the 
quality of survey and clearance.
NPA’s land-release methodology is adaptable to accommo-
date unique situations in any given country with universally 
applicable, generic principles. When releasing land, NPA col-
lects and analyzes evidence of mines/ERW, including CMR, 
and employs a process to identify degrees of confidence in 
mined or mine-free areas. This scale of confidence provides 
a basis for determining further survey-related action and a 
mechanism that can justify land release once high confidence 
in a mine-free area is attained. Two interlinked processes 
are fundamental for the effective implementation of clear-
ance obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-person-
nel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel Mine Ban 
Convention or APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Muni-
tions (CCM): Every effort must be taken to identify the prob-
lem, and resolving the problem and releasing contaminated 
land requires efficient processes.
Extent of Contamination
Understanding how various components of survey and 
land release interlink requires a clear and explicit layout of the 
wider survey and land-release process. Implementing the pro-
visions of the conventions requires a major survey effort before 
identifying and recording contaminated areas. States Parties 
often neglect this requirement and record contamination too 
hastily, which makes the size of contamination appear more 
extensive than it is in reality and leads to the disproportionate 
use of TS and clearance resources. 
NPA’s land-release concepts emphasize evidence-based sur-
vey and accurate recording of contamination before attempting 
to carry out clearance. Emphasis must be on confirmed evi-
dence of mines/CMR as opposed to liberal recordings of large 
areas with unspecified residual risk, which increase in large 
unpopulated areas where information about contamination 
SHA - Target for evidence-based survey
Evidence-based survey
(NTS, TS)
Progressive cancellation of land
Area with restrictions - AWR




Figure 1. Principal layout of the survey and land release pro-
cess. It is applicable to countries that are States Parties with 
clearance obligations under the APMBC and CCM, as well as 
all countries with contamination. 
All figures courtesy of the author.
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Managing Residual Clearance:  
 Learning From Europe’s Past
by Samuel Paunila [ GICHD ]
Lessons learned from residual clearance in post-1945 Europe may apply to long-term clearance 







In light of current conflicts, it is easy to forget that many European countries still manage World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) contamination. Over decades, these countries devel-
oped practices and policies that could help shape priority set-
ting and risk management in countries more recently affected 
by ERW. Post-conflict countries could learn from the early 
mistakes in European responses and benefit from practical ap-
proaches that address residual threats at varying depths and 
with differing time frames. 
The historical evolution of best practices since WWII can 
also assist countries in policy design beyond the fulfillment of 
commitments under the international Convention for Cluster 
Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel Mine Ban 
Convention or APMBC). Understanding when to start and 
stop the implementation of proactive clearance serves as an 
excellent foundation for residual clearance policies.1 
Understanding Before Acting
One of the immediate challenges facing countries 
recovering from armed conflict is the prevention of further 
casualties from ERW contamination. After addressing 
immediate concerns, including protecting citizens and 
critical national infrastructure from explosive hazards, 
governments strive to secure safe environments for daily life 
and socioeconomic recovery.2 With internal and external 
pressures in play, the following limitations often characterize 
this early stage:
•	 No time for planning comprehensive surveys
•	 Inadequate information on the scale and impact of ERW 
contamination
•	 Policymakers’ inability to approach the threat of ERW 
through risk management. 
As a result, some countries provided ambiguous estimates regard-
ing years of ERW clearance required, adding to the confusion.3
From Proactive to Responsive
Responsible governments logically adopt a proactive 
approach to ERW during and immediately after armed 
conflict. Implementation usually involves a rapid survey 
covering large areas with clearance operations aiming for 
exhaustive eradication of ERW, at least in priority areas. 
With time and progress, these operations usually report a 
decline in ERW encountered and make priority and highly- 
contaminated areas safe from surface and shallow ERW. 
Meanwhile, institutional knowledge within the responsible 
authority improves on typology, extent and implications of 
the remaining contamination.4 With less ERW to address, the 
high costs of proactive clearance yields decreasing marginal 
returns and, in absolute terms, often debatable increases in 
public safety. The reduced threat from remaining ERW raises 
the need for the country to readjust its priorities and response 
policy to better reflect modern risk management.5
World War II Lessons
Several European and Asian countries experienced exten-
sive and prolonged bombardments from air, sea and land dur-
ing WWII, resulting in significant ERW contamination per 
square kilometer (247 ac) of territory.6 In fact, more than 30 
countries continue to discover  and clear WWII-era ERW. For 
instance, the U.K. regularly recovers deeply buried bombs 
from the greater London area. Many ERW remain at the bot-
tom of the River Thames. Germany’s experience of bomb-
ing during WWII was more intense and sustained, leaving a 
widespread legacy of surface and shallow contamination in 
cities and the countryside. Two million tons of ordnance were 
dropped, with an estimated 100,000 unexploded bombs re-
maining in present-day Germany.7 Up to 10 aircraft bombs 
are still found yearly in Berlin alone.
The intensity of the destruction in specific areas of the U.K. 
and Germany compares with the shelling and bombing of 
Laos and Vietnam, which began with the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954 and continued through the end of the Vietnam 
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War in 1973.8 Sixty years after the First Indochina War and 40 
years since the war in Vietnam, the management of residual 
ERW in this region is highly relevant and could benefit from a 
fresh perspective and transfer of knowledge. 
After WWII, European governments had to make major 
decisions on prioritization and public safety, assessing econ-
omies of scale in dealing with residual abandoned and un-
exploded ordnance. The primary regulator for the evolution 
of policies prior to establishment of the International Small 
Arms Control or International Mine Action Standards was 
common sense; not every square meter could or should be 
cleared in each area suspected of containing ERW. The con-
tamination had to be treated differently depending on if the 
ERW was at the surface or buried. Economic and infrastruc-
ture pressures often resulted in release of land to the popu-
lation before it was guaranteed that the land was safe to a 
specified depth. It was, and still is, every citizen’s responsibil-
ity to be vigilant and report ERW findings to local authorities. 
Evolution of Policies
Since 1945, countries’ responses to ERW evolved through 
a series of reality checks. On the one hand, authorities had to 
weigh the extent and type of contamination with the de facto 
danger to population and infrastructure. On the other hand, 
they needed to assess available technical and human resourc-
es, as well as their efficiency and associated costs. The reality 
of these competing priorities was no more apparent than in 
post-WWII London, where more than one million destroyed 
buildings needed to be rebuilt.9
The policies of that era were guided by early applications of 
risk management and implemented by experienced, yet often 
poorly equipped, operators and advisers. The first two decades 
after WWII could be described as a showcase of varying degrees 
of resilience in London and Berlin, learning from mistakes 
of unregulated work while pushing for new perspectives 
and procedures for ERW practices. During the 1970s, civil-
reporting mechanisms became more effective by moving 
data from war archives to the first interactive information-
management systems. The management of residual ERW soon 
evolved as a mechanism of shared responsibility with specified 
tasks for armed forces, emergency services, civil servants, 
citizenry, and more recently for commercial contractors. 
Proactive, Reactive, Responsive
The U.K.’s early ERW response policies were primarily 
reactive, and Germany implemented a combination of 
Balham underground station in Southwest London after a raid on the evening of 14 October 1941, when 68 people died after 
pipes burst causing water and silt to fill the station.
Photo courtesy of Imperial War Museum.
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reactive and proactive policies. In both contexts, assessing, 
treating and reducing risk became a suitable approach to 
managing residual ERW. The policy implementation had to 
be transparent to the public, thus reflecting society’s values 
while including liability aspects in light of decreasing public 
tolerance toward ERW casualties.
Present ERW clearance in European countries is largely 
responsive compared to operations conducted immediately 
after WWII. Many of the affected countries now operate on 
the premise that ERW contamination cannot be totally elimi-
nated, but the hazards associated with remaining ERW can 
be mitigated through risk education, responsive local threat 
assessments and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).10 This 
assumption of acceptance of long-term residual risk and dif-
ferentiation between responses on surface, shallow and deep 
residual contamination starkly contrasts with the admirable 
yet abstract policies that continue advocating for total eradi-
cation of ERW.11,12
Emerging countries that experienced major bombard-
ments following the 1960s, such as Laos and Vietnam, com-
pleted most of their post-war reconstruction and now enter 
long-term development. However, some of their current con-
tracting and budgeting modalities encourage continued pro-
active ERW clearance over less expensive survey activities, 
land-use assessments and risk reduction through spot EOD.13 
Moreover, policymakers may overestimate the impact of ERW, 
in particular that of deeply buried bombs.14
For instance, the response requirements 
for ERW on the surface and at shallow depths 
vary significantly to that of the U.K.’s deep-
ly buried bombs, wherein the latter are miti-
gated reactively by default. A good example of 
this policy’s implementation is the construc-
tion project of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic 
Park in London prior to the Summer Olympic 
Games in 2012. The entire area was heavily 
bombed during WWII. Based on the bombing 
data, deeply buried ERW could emerge during 
the park’s construction.15 A risk assessment 
deliberately avoided proactive clearance of the 
park. The level of preparedness was raised for 
the reactive bomb disposal. After an air bomb 
was recovered, an expert examined it and, as 
anticipated, was unable to pinpoint the impli-
cations of corrosion in the metal and explosive 
components. However, the expert was able to 
establish whether the bomb presented a dan-
ger in its current location and the extent of 
protective works needed.
Lessons Learned
Central to managing residual ERW is strong national own-
ership of risk and response, and well-performing authorities 
with solid understanding of liability, operational efficien-
cy and risk management. ERW tasks are best suited to be the 
shared function and responsibility of civil defense and mili-
tary that maintain the budgets and mobile-response capacity.16
Following the organizational structure, suitable infor-
mation management and reporting systems differentiate be-
tween surface (and shallow subsurface) contamination and 
deeply buried bombs. Clearance of the former and other sur-
face items with particular humanitarian impact are included 
in States Parties’ obligations toward the CCM and APMBC. 
Such surface items include cluster munitions banned by the 
CCM and anti-personnel mines banned by the APMBC. Trea-
ties do not ban other items such as mortar bombs and hand 
grenades, but they are dangerous and render a humanitarian 
impact if detonated.
Deeply buried bombs cannot be easily surveyed over 
large areas nor can communities readily identify them; of-
ten they become a challenge only after being discovered dur-
ing construction and development activities. Therefore, most 
long-term contamination that does not pose immediate hu-
manitarian danger could be addressed by adopting a risk-
management approach and introducing more sustainable, 
Locations of bombs reported to have fallen during the period of the London 
Blitz in and around the area of the London Olympic Park.
Photo courtesy of www.bombsight.org.
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Environmentally Responsible 
 SAA Disposal
The need to dispose of small arms ammunition (SAA) for short-term stability and security concerns 
has traditionally outweighed the long-term need for environmentally responsible disposal. The au-
thor suggests the international community should change its procedures concerning SAA disposal 
and promote more environmentally friendly disposal methods. 
by Ian Biddle [ G4S Ordnance Management Ltd. ]
An estimated 750,000 arms-related deaths occur ev-ery year.1 According to Amnesty International, con-flict and armed violence kills 1,500 people daily.2
In 2006, the Bonn International Center for Conversions 
estimated that “hundreds of thousands of tonnes of surplus 
ammunition inherited from the Cold War are thought to 
be held in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The relevant 
U.N. office in Southeastern Europe has estimated surplus 
stocks of ammunition from only ten countries in the region as 
follows” [see Table 1].3
terrorists and criminals, and SAA is a major destabilizing fac-
tor in post-conflict situations.4 Reducing the availability of 
small arms, light weapons and SAA is a priority in all dis-
armament, demobilization and reintegration programs. Ac-
cording to an article by Oxfam International, “Ammunition 
supplies have an impact on the ability of combatants to engage 
in hostilities. A shortage of bullets can reduce or even stop 
fighting altogether … ”3
Disposing of Surplus SAA 
Disposing of SAA is difficult in bulk. Expending ammu-
nition through live fire is not viable if a stockpile consists of 
hundreds of thousands of rounds. Mechanical destruction re-
quires the deformation of every cartridge. Burial is a popular 
form of caching SAA for later use, as it resists corrosion. Sea 
dumping is prohibited, as ammunition and explosives are con-
sidered hazardous industrial waste and fall under the remit of 
international treaties: the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter; the 
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (amended 
2006); and the 1998 Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic.5,6,7
The only viable method of bulk destruction is incineration 
through open burning (OB), industrial incineration or incin-
eration via mobile incinerator. 
Open Burning
In the past, the requirement of disposing surplus SAA 
quickly to promote stability and security overrode the re-
quirement to dispose of SAA in an environmentally respon-
sible manner. OB can produce atmospheric and terrestrial 
heavy metal pollution from molten bullet cores, which inevi-






FRY Macedonia 10,000 tons
Moldova 20,000 tons
Romania 100,000 tons
Serbia and Montenegro 100,000 tons
Ukraine 2,000,000 tons
Table 1. Estimated surplus of ammunition stocks from 10 
countries in Southeastern Europe.3
Table courtesy of the author/CISR.
Additionally, the recent upheavals in the Middle East 
and Africa have littered the respective regions with small 
arms ammunition (SAA).4 Ammunition from these and oth-
er stockpiles leaked across international borders. Temporary 
munitions stockpiles established to support military oper-
ations, in which SAA is the longest lasting and most stable 
component, are often abandoned. Post-conflict, abandoned 
stockpiles are a principal source of ammunition for insurgents, 
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According to an evaluation in Canada of heavy metal con-
tamination after OB in 2001, “… small arms bullets contain a 
98% lead, 2% antimony alloy ... Tracer rounds contain stron-
tium, molybdenum, and carbon tetrachloride ... The incin-
eration of these toxic materials can understandably lead to 
adverse environmental impacts. If burning is not tightly con-
trolled, temperatures may easily surpass 525°C, the point at 
which lead begins to vapourise. Unless a robust filtration ap-
paratus is used to scrub such emissions, lead-contaminated 
particulates will be released into the environment.”8
OB in a pit or a burning tank is easy to implement using 
materials and technology readily available in less-developed 
countries. As a common form of field disposal, OB is suitable 
for SAA quantities of a few thousand rounds at a time, length-
ening the process when a stockpile weighs several tons.
A number of OB techniques can destroy ammunition na-
tures safely and efficiently. These include open-pit burning 
using specially built burning boxes, either static or mobile. 
Readily available materials, such as disused 50-gallon oil 
drums, provide excellent containers to burn SAA.9 Advan-
tages include high production rates and very low costs. How-
ever, the container must cool for 24 hours before subsequent 
burns. The main disadvantage of OB procedures is ensuing 
air pollution.10 
The theoretical incineration temperature is around 
2,000 C (3,632 F), but this assumes perfect burning and 
complete stoichiometric conversion, and does not account for 
heat loss due to wind or other factors.11 
In practice, OB produces a dense smoke plume consis-
tent with incineration at a lower temperature and similar to 
plumes found in house fires at about 600 C (1,112 F) instead 
of the 800 C (1,472 F) required to eliminate volatile organ-
ic compounds, which are major health hazards. Using rela-
tively small samples, experiments have been conducted under 
controlled conditions and quickly rising temperatures. Un-
der field conditions, a gradual temperature rise occurs with 
incomplete and inefficient burning. This produces the char-
acteristic plumes of dense dirty smoke. OB is also slow. After 
burning, time lapse must occur before the pit or tank can be 
reused, limiting the number of burns to one per day and driv-
ing up costs. This is often ignored when attention is focused 
on the cost of equipment rather than the cost of the total pro-
cess. Although the use of SAA burning tanks is cheap to initi-
ate, the length of time required to dispose of a stockpile means 
that labor costs quickly escalate. Thus, the entire exercise can 
be more expensive and polluting than if a more expensive but 
productive incinerator had been used.
Industrial Incineration
Industrial SAA incineration avoids the pollution problems 
associated with OB. A kiln is preheated to a specific tempera-
ture to achieve complete stoichiometric conversion of the pro-
pellant; emissions are filtered and scrubbed; and there is no 
heavy metal pollution. As a continuous process, this allows for 
higher disposal rates while reducing the time needed to dis-
pose of large stockpiles. 
Transportable SAA disposal system, Afghanistan, 2013.
Photo courtesy of Kenn Underwood.
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Conventional Munitions Disposal  
 Capacity Development in 
  South Sudan
The United Nations Mine Action Service is training members of South Sudan’s National Police 
Service in order to develop a self-sustainable nationwide capacity for conventional munitions 
disposal in the country.
by Commandant Fran O’Grady [ Defence Forces Ireland ]
South Sudan’s struggle to nationhood included two rounds of civil strife spanning almost 40 years (1955–1972 and 1983–2005)—the longest war in African 
history. With euphoria and high expectations, South Sudan 
gained independence 9 July 2011, but its split from Sudan 
has been difficult. Despite a massive influx of international 
aid, the nation remains one of the most impoverished and 
least developed in the world. The ongoing violence and intra-
governmental fighting in South Sudan is deeply rooted in 
historical divisions, and power struggles continue among 
political protagonists.
Further, development statistics indicate that more than 50 
percent of the South Sudanese live below the poverty line, na-
tional life expectancy is 42 years of age and maternal mortal-
ity is the highest in the world.1 The Small Arms Survey notes 
that a 2006 survey recording 2,054 deaths per 100,000 live 
births may have been an underestimation.2
In addition, South Sudan inherited vast amounts of land 
contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). As the South Sudanese address the monumental task 
of nation building, the need to clear these hazardous areas is a 
priority. In response, the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) began a three-year initiative in 2013 to train select-
ed members of South Sudan’s police service in order to estab-
lish a national capacity for conventional munitions disposal 
(CMD)—a joint project supported by the Irish Defence Forces, 
the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United 
Nations Police and the National Mine Action Authority.
Bridging the Gap
The desired end state for the UNMAS capacity develop-
ment initiative is the establishment of a self-sustainable, 
nationwide CMD capability for the South Sudan National 
Police Service (SSNPS). To achieve this, trained police CMD 
teams must be available and deployable to all 10 states (with 
a total of 78 counties) in South Sudan. The goal is to field 78 
teams, one for each county.
CMD Training
The eight-week pilot training of the first SSNPS CMD 
course commenced in mid-September 2013, and three teams 
deployed to the Greater Bar El Ghazal region (namely, Western 
Bar El Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes states) in early November. 
The course work of future CMD trainings will incorporate 
lessons learned from the pilot course (administrative, logis-
tic and training). The plan is to conduct approximately four 
of these eight-week courses each year for three years. The 
best students from these courses will subsequently undertake 
train-the-trainer courses, thereby facilitating the handover 
for the responsibility for all CMD training to SSNPS in 2016.
One fundamental lesson learned involved the pace of 
instruction, which needed specific tailoring to the South 
A CMD team member conducts a disposal task.
All photos courtesy of UNMAS South Sudan team.
29
JOURNAL: The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Issue 18.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2014 30
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 18, Iss.  [2014], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-j urnal/vol18/iss1/1
30 feature | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2014 | 18.1
Sudanese context since many participants had limited educa-
tion. The consideration of education levels, previous courses 
completed and language barriers was integral when determin-
ing the duration of the training. Student Charles Noon com-
mented, “Before this course I had only primary school. These 
lectures and calculations are new to me and very difficult, but 
I am learning and my [weekly course assessment] results are 
getting better.”3
This technical and difficult course could not be rushed 
if students were to thoroughly learn the material. The ini-
tial stages of the course demonstrated that strict adherence 
to length requirements for class periods may not be helpful. 
Instead, a more flexible approach to time management was 
adopted, which ensured that the students finished the class 
only after acquiring a firm understanding of the material. 
For instance, lessons originally planned for 40 minutes were 
allowed to last more than an hour to ensure that students 
grasped the concepts. 
All lectures, lesson plans and tutorials were reconstruct-
ed to fit into a flexible timetable. The objective was to create 
an environment-specific training framework that would in-
clude tasks the teams might face during operations. By main-
taining this continuous cycle of course review and refinement, 
the training program can evolve and succeed. UNMAS staff 
member and CMD operator Rambo Isaac is a South Sudanese 
national and works as a translator when needed. He says, “We 
are all [staff and students] learning every day on this course 
in our own different ways. This is a dangerous job that the 
students are being trained to do and it is very important that 
the students and staff communicate well. The students must 
feel comfortable at all times to speak up if they don’t under-
stand something. This is a two-way process.”4
Typically, demining operations consist of large-scale, pre-
planned deployments of demining teams that systematically 
clear defined hazardous areas over an extended period of 
time. This generally involves a significant logistical footprint 
as well as assets such as mechanical mine flails or tillers and 
mine detection dogs. 
Although CMD operator and deminer skill sets overlap, 
SSNPS CMD teams are not structured, trained or tasked like 
demining teams. In contrast, these small CMD teams are 
meant to provide flexible, mobile and timely responses to 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal requests in countries 
where they are based. For example, in the event that a mortar 
bomb is reported in a village, the local CMD team will deploy 
from its police station to the site, liaise locally, identify the 
hazard, cordon the area, dispose of the mortar, return to the 
police station and provide a technical report through the rel-
evant channels. 
Isaac captures the relationship between these discrete but 
interrelated functions: “The idea is that the demining teams 
and police CMD teams will complement each other operation-
ally … [t]hey are just different tools in the toolbox that hopes to 
fix the [mine and ERW] problem here in South Sudan.”4
The course is based out of the Rajaf Police Training 
Centre, near the nation’s capital Juba. UNMAS funded and 
Members of the Irish Defence Forces training team brief students on the demolition range.
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Lessons From Lebanon:  
 Rubble Removal and  
  Explosive Ordnance Disposal
The insight and knowledge gained from rubble removal and explosive ordnance disposal in the 
Nahr el-Bared Camp, which was destroyed during heavy fighting in Lebanon in 2007, could greatly 
benefit future reconstruction efforts in war-damaged urban areas.
by Erik K. Lauritzen [ Lauritzen Advising ]
Clearing damaged buildings in densely populated urban areas is a high-priority in the reconstruc-tion of war-torn countries. After long periods of 
intense fighting, the need for unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
disposal, combined with rubble removal, increases the chal-
lenge of rebuilding.
Clearance of war-damaged buildings, recycling of building 
materials and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) were essen-
tial phases of past urban reconstruction projects. Prominent 
examples included Beirut after the 15-year civil war (1975–
1990), Sarajevo and Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 
Bosnian War (1992–1995), and Kosovo after NATO interven-
tion in 1999. In these locations, EOD units, specialized private 
groups or nongovernmental organizations (NGO) responded 
when rubble-removal contractors found UXO. Rubble remov-
al ceased during the EOD projects but proceeded following 
EOD completion. 
EOD organizations and rubble removal contractors co-
operate through two different frameworks, depending on the 
level of contamination in an area. When the amount of UXO 
Part of the war-damaged Nahr el-Bared Camp in northern Lebanon, prior to the start of the rubble-removal project 
(August 2008).
All photos courtesy of the author.
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Figure 2. Sketch of NBC indicating location of UXO found in the Palestinian Refugee Camp of Naher el Bared 
by the end of August 2009.
Figure courtesy of UNDP, UNRWA and Handicap International.
Integrated Rubble Removal and EOD Process
The integrated rubble removal and EOD work involved
•	 Demolishing structures on and removing rubble from 
work sites
•	 Loading rubble onto trucks and transporting it from the 
work site to the laydown area for final inspection and 
additional UXO survey4
•	 Transporting rubble declared free of explosives by HI to 
the final disposal area 
Each of HI’s four EOD teams included a team leader and 
four UXO operators. The EOD and rubble-removal teams 
worked together to remove all rubble layer by layer and clear 
UXO until the terrain’s surface was reached and cleared. The 
following procedures were used:
•	 EOD teams visually surveyed the work area before 
entering.
•	 UXO was removed and/or marked for destruction on site.
•	 The rubble-removal team used machines to gradually 
clear the area to the natural ground level, stopping for 
UXO removal or destruction as needed.
•	 At the natural ground level, the EOD team performed a 
survey of the newly exposed surface. 
•	 Any additional UXO found was removed or de-
stroyed, and remaining rubble at the natural ground 
level was removed.
•	 HI certified the surface UXO clearance and LMAC ap-
proved the clearance in accordance with IMAS.
EOD team leaders moved UXO considered to be safe to 
a central UXO demolition site in an open concrete bunker 
and destroyed it by detonation. UXO considered unsafe to 
move was destroyed on-site. On-site detonation temporar-
ily closed the area, stopping all activities and resulting in 
worker evacuation. 
By the end of the work in September 2009, a total of 11,348 
items were found. Excluding weapons and small-arms am-
munition, approximately 2,500 (22 percent) were hazardous 
explosive items. Figure 2 and Table 1 present UXO details 
and distribution.
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AMMUNITION 
TYPE OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP TOTAL
Rifl e
grenades 12 111 184 197 125 89 68 89 90 49 48 32 1,094
Hand 
grenades 3 21 46 42 28 21 13 12 18 12 4 5 225
Projectiles 4 40 42 24 28 13 14 12 5 9 12 9 212
Mortar
shells 6 57 95 80 88 53 26 40 27 35 31 22 560
Rockets 0 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 11
Bombs 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
RPGs 0 2 8 5 3 1 1 0 8 0 2 1 31
Mines 0 4 4 0 2 0 2 5 0 0 5 1 23
Fuzes 0 10 13 47 23 8 14 25 20 23 9 5 197
Small-arms 
ammunition 0 190 404 636 2,122 573 314 295 1,352 1,134 1,180 416 8,616
Miscellaneous 0 8 38 44 77 9 6 1 12 1 58 0 254
Weapons 1 5 6 13 22 6 21 3 6 19 13 6 121
Total 26 451 842 1,090 2,520 777 479 482 1,538 1,282 1,363 498 11,348
Booby traps 1 14 17 9 3 2 3 6 1 5 5 5 71
Table 1. Items of UXO found each month according to Handicap International’s report from October 2008 to September 2009.
Table courtesy of author/CISR.
Cooperation and Conflicting Interests
The contractual setup, including the decision to split the 
rubble-removal contract and the EOD contract into two in-
dependent contracts, proved crucial during the project imple-
mentation. All partners expressed the importance of proper 
coordination between the rubble-removal contractor and the 
EOD contractor to ensure NBC’s successful recovery and re-
construction. However, at the project’s inception, the partners 
did not fully understand the methodology of cooperation and 
team building essential to working in the field.
The EOD contractors’ prioritization of safety in a time-
variable contract and the rubble-removal contractor’s prior-
itization of work speed due to a fixed-price, time-restricted 
contract were in disaccord, causing frustration and conflicts 
of interest throughout the project. The rubble-removal con-
tractor allegedly did not understand the requirement of ar-
moring the machines and providing personal protection 
equipment for demolition workers. Moreover, the EOD con-
tractor often claimed that the rubble-removal contractor’s 
personnel did not respect the safety rules. Additionally, due to 
the safety-distance requirements for rubble removal, allocat-
ing work for all four EOD teams on the site was difficult. As a 
result of positive dialogue, the two partners found a suitable 
modus operandi on a daily basis respecting safety and work 
performance to successfully complete the project.
Security, Health and Safety
The project’s successful implementation depended on 
overall security in north Lebanon. During the implementation 
period, the situation was calm: No serious incidents occurred 
with no negative environmental impact on the work. According 
to the UNRWA-UNDP agreement, UNDP and UNRWA were 
responsible for the safety and security of the UNDP project-
management unit. UNRWA was responsible for the safety of 
all UNDP staff on a daily basis within NBC, while UNRWA 
managed the relationship with NBC authorities, including the 
military and the EOD contractor. UNDP was responsible for 
the planning and management of health and safety on-site. 
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The rubble-removal contractor presented a comprehensive 
health-and-safety plan, which included occupational health 
and work-safety precautions. 
The EOD contractor was responsible for overall EOD and 
rubble-removal safety and managed the risk of uncontrolled 
UXO detonation in accordance with IMAS.
LAF controlled access to NBC and supervised on-site ac-
tivities. The access procedures were somewhat problematic 
at the start of the project; however, thanks to very successful 
cooperation between the project partners and LAF, the daily 
work on-site ran smoothly throughout the project’s duration.
Because of the high risk of uncontrolled UXO detonation, 
the EOD teams and the rubble-removal teams followed spe-
cific requirements in accordance with LMAC’s accreditation 
of the EOD contractor’s work procedures. The most important 
safety rules were as follows:
•	 All personnel on the work site were required to wear 
personal protective equipment, which included a helmet 
with an eye screen and a body vest.
•	 All machines operating on-site needed protection with 
armor and safety glass. 
•	 The required safety distance between the machines and 
teams was 100 m (109 yd).
•	 The required safety distance between unprotected per-
sonnel and machines was 250 m (273 yd).
•	 All personnel working on site were provided information 
and UXO awareness training by the EOD contractor. 
•	 Before entering the site, all personnel were required 
to report to the EOD contractor’s checkpoint and be 
registered.
Figure 4. NBC risk assessment by MAG. UXO-contaminated 
zones: Red area—heavy density (50 to 125 units of UXO per 
hectare) and possible five unexploded 250 kg air bombs; Am-
ber area—normal density (13-49 units of UXO per hectare); 
Green area—light density (6–12 units of UXO per hectare).
Figure courtesy of MAG, Risk Assessment Report, April 2008.
    Success Criteria
 • The rubble removal shall be completed in such a way that the respective areas are cleared
    and ready for construction works in accordance with the reconstruction project’s time plan.
 • Neighbors must be satisfi ed, and the number of claims by neighbors must be low.
 
 • No serious accidents should occur.
 
 • The greatest possible amount of rubble will be recycled and reused for the benefi t of the
   NBC reconstruction project, and the smallest possible amount of materials will be disposed
   of at public landfi ll sites.
 • The project should deploy a large number of local, NBC people.
 • No negative discussions should be in the media.
 • No additional costs should be incurred.
Figure 3. Success criteria of the NBC rubble-removal project.
Figure courtesy of the author/CISR.
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D Quality Management Systems  
 in Mine Action Programs
The United Nations Mine Action Service in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the pro-
cess of implementing a new quality management system (QMS) for mine action in DRC. The QMS 
was implemented in July 2013 and its progress continues to be carefully monitored each quarter. 
by Pascal Simon and Stefan De Coninck [ UNMAS-DRC ]
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), es-tablished national standards and quality assurance 
(QA) and quality control (QC) policies for mine action and 
implemented a quality management system (QMS) in May 
2011 based on the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) guidelines. Key quality processes, such as accredita-
tion, monitoring and post-clearance inspection, follow the 
IMAS guidelines.  
However, the implementation of the QMS at the grass 
roots level was not uniform. The reasons were obvious:  Many 
inconsistencies in applying QMS could be attributed to a dy-
namic program with frequent changes in personnel, whose 
backgrounds and experiences varied, and changes in the lo-
cations of teams as they moved for different clearance opera-
tions. To address these challenges, UNMAS-DRC decided to 
examine the QMS rather than the personnel implementing 
the system.
After review, UNMAS-DRC found that one of the core rea-
sons for noncompliance with QMS was the perception that the 
system was an “add on” to operational work. Staff did not find 
a link between the increase of quality management (QM) and 
the strengthening of operational procedures. 
As a result, UNMAS-DRC sought to integrate QMS into 
daily operations so that it would no longer be perceived as a 
separate task. This required an objective means of measuring 
compliance with the system. UNMAS-DRC chose to imple-
ment a balanced scorecard (BSC) system, which had been suc-
cessfully implemented in other UNMAS programs, such as in 
Afghanistan. In the BSC system, each office or organization 
receives a weekly score based on the accuracy and timeliness 
of their reports and on external and internal QA requirements. 
In addition to measuring compliance of mine action organiza-
tions, the BSC measures compliance of UNMAS-DRC region-
al operational offices. 
To help implement the BSC system, UNMAS-DRC re-
quested the assistance of the Swiss Armed Forces’ Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Centre, which provided a QM ad-
viser. Together, the Swiss QM adviser and UNMAS estab-
lished a QM board consisting of UNMAS operations and 
program section representatives to ensure agreement on all 
proposed actions and changes. 
Objectives
The starting point for any QMS is the senior management’s 
policy on QA and QC. The previous UNMAS-DRC QM policy 
did not take into account changes in goals for the DRC pro-
gram, which are now guided by the recently adopted nation-
al mine action strategy and national legislation. In 2002, the 
DRC government signed the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-personnel 
Mine Ban Convention or APMBC). In 2008, a national focal 
point structure was created within the Ministry of Interior to 
handle mine action in DRC. Parliament passed mine action 
legislation in June 2011. A key component of these develop-
ments, which needed to be included in the new QMS, was the 
aim to transition capacity for the planning, tasking and coor-
dination of all mine action activities in DRC from UNMAS 
to the Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (Congolese Centre 
for Mine Action or CCLAM).
After reviewing the previous QM policy drafted in 2010, 
the QM board approved a QM policy in January 2013 with 
three main objectives for the mine action program:
1. Ensure that UNMAS-DRC activities maintain a con-
sistent level of quality, meet all legal requirements 
and comply with United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) policies and international stan-
dards related to mine action, such as IMAS and the 
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. 
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hunting and transporting goods to mar-
kets. These activities expose them to more 
landmine and ERW threats than women 
who typically work at home. 
Relatedly, a “macho culture” exists 
where men look to prove themselves in the 
face of danger. They are the first to check 
potentially hazardous areas to ascertain 
if a place is safe or not, thereby increasing 
their exposure to potential threats. Finally, 
ex-combatants are more prone to compla-
cent behavior when handling and manip-
ulating dangerous objects as they believe 
they are capable of handling these weapons 
due to seeing and using them in combat.   
Survivors require a disproportionate-
ly high amount of financial and medical 
resources for rehabilitation, and yet the 
majority are from rural areas without ad-
vanced medical infrastructure and with 
limited resources. While studies show that 
25 percent of the world’s landmine survi-
vors receive appropriate care, only 9 per-
cent are estimated to receive assistance in 
eastern DRC.3,4 
UNMAS’ Programs
Since 2009, the United Nations Mine 
Action Service in DRC (UNMAS-DRC) 
has provided vital assistance to survi-
vors with its partners—including organizations focusing on 
disabled people and local and international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO).5 
The Japanese and Australian governments fund the major-
ity of UNMAS’ victim-assistance programs in DRC. An esti-
mated US$550,000 was used to assist 272 mine/ERW survivors 
(85 female and 187 male) and 12 other persons with disabilities 
in the past two years in DRC. The grants supported physical 
rehabilitation and economic reinsertion (including mine risk 
education), a national landmine-contamination survey and 
ERW/mine clearance. Heri Kuetu and Shirika La Umoja re-
habilitation centers also received support to provide medical 
care and physical rehabilitation, and provided a range of mo-
bility aids, including prostheses and other assistive devices, to 
the selected survivors.    
Selected beneficiaries were trained in income-generating 
activities and were provided with reinsertion kits comprised 
of in-kind, start-up capital to enable small trade in marketable 
items in their areas. The training period varied between one 
and three months, depending on the Income Generating 
Activities (IGA) chosen by the survivors. The basic training in 
small-scale business management took about five days, while 
other vocations like tailoring took at least three months. Each 
UNMAS-DRC partner organization used subgrants to hire 
trainers to provide the training in the relevant operational 
areas. Trainers had experience in microfinance, livelihood 
and socioeconomic sectors. 
In 2013 UNMAS granted US$150,000 to help national or-
ganizations assist 207 survivors (63 females and 144 males). 
The average cost of assistance per survivor is around $1,500, 
a necessary investment toward ensuring change in the lives of 
survivors and their families. The investment is comparative-
ly high because UNMAS-DRC aims to make beneficiaries fi-
nancially independent. The survivors are involved in all steps 
of the project to promote ownership and sustainability. Prior-
ity is given to feasible and sustainable projects. In addition to 
Itongwa Wilonja tries his newly acquired bike at Shirika La Umoja rehabilitation 
center in Goma, DRC (June 2013).
Photo courtesy of Syahava Kambale Sylvain/Shirika La Umoja.
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Machine-integrated Magnetic  
 Collector Design and Testing
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining led a test program to evaluate a machine-
integrated magnetic collection system. Promising results suggest it could speed up manual follow-up 
activities and provide valuable data during technical survey operations.
by Erik de Brun [ GICHD Consultant ] and Stephen Ahnert [ GICHD Consultant ]
In 2011 and 2012, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitar-ian Demining (GICHD) led a test program to evaluate the feasibil-ity and effectiveness of a mechanical demining, machine-integrated 
magnetic collector designed to collect ferrous metal debris during flail-
ing operations. The purposes of this integration and test effort were to 
determine if
•	 A machine-integrated magnet would collect metal debris during 
flailing operations
•	 A machine-integrated magnet would increase the efficiency of de-
mining operations by speeding up manual follow-up (especially 
when working in an area with high metal contamination)
•	 Collected debris could be utilized to support technical survey 
operations
Together, the GICHD and DOK-ING designed a magnetic collection 
system and integrated it with an MV-4 flail. In March 2012, the authors, 
along with other team members from the Swedish Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal and Demining Center (SWEDEC) and DOK-ING, conducted 
functional and statistical testing in Zagreb, Croatia. During function-
al testing, the setup and configuration of the magnetic collection sys-
tem was optimized and subsequently utilized for statistical testing. The 
statistical testing results were very promising, with 44% (240 of 544) of 
the seeded ferrous debris recovered during the first pass of the machine 
and 34% (102 of 304) of the remaining debris recovered on the second 
pass. In the end, 68% (371 of 544) of the seeded debris was collected. Al-
though the testing was only conducted in one set of conditions and uti-
lized seeded debris, the collection percentages are sufficiently high to 
suggest that a machine-integrated magnetic collector could dramatical-
ly reduce the amount of ferrous material remaining in the field following 
flailing operations. If results hold in field conditions, this methodolo-
gy could dramatically speed up manual follow-up activities and provide 
valuable data during technical survey operations.
Introduction
Mechanical demining systems can greatly increase the effectiveness, 
safety and efficiency of mine-clearance operations. They clear or release 
large areas more quickly and safely than manual demining alone. In most 
cases, national standards require some form of manual follow-up after 
machine clearance, which can range from visual inspection to full manu-
al clearance requiring the removal of all metal debris. When 100% metal-
free clearance is required or when operating in areas heavily contaminated 
with ferrous material, follow-up manual clearance can be painstakingly 
slow because every metal detector indication must be investigated. 
GICHD recognizes that, combined with mechanical tools or as 
stand-alone assets, magnets can increase manual clearance productivity 
by removing ferrous metal debris from the clearance area. In addition, 
the collection of metal debris can provide invaluable information about 
the type and location of contamination during technical survey and 
clearance operations. Ideally, magnet-equipped machines would collect 
a large percentage of the metal contamination in a given area, increasing 
overall operational efficiency.
GICHD previously tested a combined flail and magnet system using 
a Bozena 5 that towed a permanent magnet. An operational assessment 
was conducted in Azerbaijan between January and March 2010. The 
towed magnet picked up some ferrous debris, and recovery effective-
ness was very low overall. A full report on the testing can be obtained 
from GICHD.1 Based on that testing’s results, several improvements to 
the magnetic collector design and configuration were hypothesized, 
and DOK-ING was contracted to assist with design and construction 
of a revised magnetic collector that would be integrated directly with 
the machine flail head. This article documents the testing that GICHD 
conducted at DOK-ING’s manufacturing facility in Zagreb, Croatia, in 
March 2012.
Materials and Location
The following testing equipment was used:
DOK-ING MV-4. Two separate MV-4 machines with flail attach-
ments were utilized during testing.
Magnetic roller. A magnetic roller was one component of the mag-
netic collection system. Measuring 220 mm in diameter and 1,740 mm 
wide, it was installed directly behind the flail head (Figure 2, page 53). On 
each roller’s side, teeth ensured that it rotated as the machine advanced. 
The roller height relative to the flail was adjustable. The roller contained 
Figure 1. DOK-ING MV-4 utilized during testing.
All graphics courtesy of the authors/GICHD.
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242 neodymium permanent magnets (each 42 mm by 40 mm by 6 mm) 
spaced evenly, adhered directly to the base metal roller and covered with 
an abrasion-resistant rubber. Field strength of the magnets was 0.17 
Tesla on the dorsal and ventral faces, and 0.34 Tesla on the lateral faces.
Magnetic sheet. Another component of the magnetic collection sys-
tem was a magnetic sheet (Figure 3 above) that was mounted behind the 
flail head in place of the chain guard. The sheet was 1,740 mm wide by 
500 mm tall with magnets present in the lower two-thirds. The sheet 
contained 175 neodymium magnets evenly spaced in a 5-by-35 grid cov-
ered with an abrasion-resistant rubber coating, yielding an overall field 
strength of 0.2 Tesla at the sheet surface.
Magnetic upper catch. In addition to the magnetic roller and sheet, 
a magnetic catch was installed along the front edge of the flail shroud, 
above the flail head (Figure 4 right). This upper catch was designed to 
capture magnetic debris thrown forward by the flail hammers. The mag-
netic catch was constructed similarly to the sheet but contained only a 
single row of magnets.
Ferrous debris. Various types of ferrous debris (Figure 5, page 54) 
were used to seed the test lane. The debris elements were selected to 
reflect the size and shape of ferrous debris that would typically be re-
covered during actual clearance operations. Table 1 (page 55) lists the 
different types of material used during the testing.
Testing was performed in a prepared lane at DOK-ING’s main pro-
duction facility in Zagreb. The test lane was approximately 45 m long, 
4 m wide, 0.5 m deep and filled with relatively fine riverbed sand (Fig-
ure 6, page 54). 
With the weather clear, temperatures ranged between 18 C and 22 C 
during the test period. The sand was dry throughout the tests and was 
not compacted beyond the compression provided by the MV-4 tracks. 
Rakes were used between tests to level the sand as necessary, and a bull-
dozer periodically leveled the lane.
Testing Procedures
The testing was divided into two separate phases: functional/exper-
imental testing and statistical testing. During the functional tests, the 
Figure 2. Magnetic roller attachment.
Figure 3. Magnetic sheet attachment.
Figure 4. Magnetic upper catch attachment.
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setup and configuration of the magnetic collection system was varied 
in order to identify the most effective arrangement. Each setup was test-
ed using different seeding materials, flail rotational speeds, machine 
speeds and working depths in order to identify the effects of these vari-
ables on the effectiveness of the different configurations. Once the most 
effective configuration was identified, the focus shifted to statistical 
testing. The statistical testing focused on generating a consistent, sta-
tistically significant data set from which debris-recovery percentages 
could be estimated.
Functional tests. A number of functional tests were performed to 
evaluate and optimize the magnetic collection system’s performance.
•	 Series 1: surface-laid debris recovery without the flail spinning
•	 Series 2, 4 and 6: magnetic-sheet evaluation and configura-
tion optimization
•	 Series 3 and 5: magnetic-roller evaluation and configuration 
optimization
•	 Series 7: full magnetic collection system optimization (roller, 
sheet and upper catch)
Statistical tests. Based on the results of the functional testing, the fol-
lowing magnetic collection system and machine configuration (Figure 7, 
page 55) was used for all of the statistical tests:
•	 Magnetic sheet hanging immediately behind the roller with 
chains controlling the orientation
•	 Magnetic-sheet, upper-catch and magnetic-roller setup on 
same MV-4
•	 Machine-operating parameters set at a working depth of approxi-
mately 15 cm, a machine speed of approximately 1.5 km/h and 
a flail-head speed of approximately 450 rpm (50% of maximum)
•	 Roller placed in its lowest position (centerline of roller approxi-
mately 5 cm above the flail skids)
The test lane was divided into four boxes, each approximately 7 m 
long, with a gap of approximately 4 m between each area. Each box was 
seeded with a specific set of ferrous debris (Table 2 page 55) . With 68 
seeded targets in each of the four test boxes, there was a total of 272 seed-
ed items for each test. Within each test box, debris was randomly seed-
ed within a strip approximately 1.5 meters wide in the test lane’s center. 
The debris was buried to varying depths up to 15 cm. The statistical test 
was performed twice. During the first test, the seeded debris was paint-
ed green; during the second test, the seeded debris was painted yellow 
so that any remaining debris from the first test that was collected during 
the second test could be identified and excluded from the results.
After completing each box in the first test, the flail was removed so 
that captured debris could be removed and recorded. After completing 
the initial pass through the four test boxes, displaced soil was pushed 
back into the flail track with rakes. In order to see what percentage of the 
remaining debris each test box could recover, this process was repeated 
without any additional reseeding or manual clearance. A third pass was 
also performed without stopping after each box.
Before the second test, a hand-held metal detector and shovels were 
used to find and remove as much of the remaining debris as possible. 
This manual-collection effort reduced the amount of contamination for 
subsequent tests and identified the approximate depth of the debris not 
recovered by the magnets.
 The second statistical test procedure was very similar to the first test 
except that four passes were performed. During the third and fourth 
passes, the flail path was shifted slightly to the right and left, respectively, 
in order to process areas where soil was pushed out to the sides during 
the first and second passes.
Results of Functional Tests
The functional testing’s main purpose was investigating each com-
ponent of the magnetic collection system and determining the optimal 
configuration for the system as a whole. Initial testing with surface-laid 
debris showed that the debris is easily captured yet cannot be easily dis-
lodged if it comes into contact with one of 
the magnetic collectors. Testing of the mag-
netic roller showed that collection was much 
more effective if the roller was set as low as 
possible (centerline of the roller was approx-
imately 5 cm above the flail skids), allowing 
the roller to plow through the soil deposit-
ed just behind the flail head. As the machine 
advanced, the roller would push a large 
mound of soil ahead of it, causing flailed soil 
to be pushed back into the path of the up-
ward-moving flail hammers. Forward soil 
ejection from the top of the flail shield in-
creased dramatically compared to previous Figure 5. Ferrous debris utilized during testing.
Figure 6. Test lane and close-up of soil.
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Figure 7. Machine setup for statistical testing.
tests, and a substantial amount of soil flowed over the top of the roller 
(Figure 8, page 56). As a result of the soil flow over the roller, the re-
covery percentage was dramatically higher than previous tests (30–50% 
recovery), and additional passes through the same test area continued 
recovering substantial debris.
The magnetic sheet alone was not very effective (capturing up to 
20% of the debris), but the collection effectiveness was increased dra-
matically when placed just behind the roller due to the amount of soil 
contact. In addition to the magnetic collection system configurations, 
many operational variables, including fail speed and machine speed, 
were also investigated.
Based on testing, the optimal magnetic collection system configu-
ration consisted of the magnetic roller placed in its lowest position, the 
magnetic sheet positioned directly behind the roller and the upper catch 
placed at the front of the flail shield (Figure 9, page 56). All subsequent 
statistical testing utilized this configuration.
Results of Statistical Tests
The optimized magnetic collection system configuration (Figure 
10, page 56) utilized during the statistical testing proved quite effective. 
During the two combined statistical tests, 44% (240 of 544) of the seed-
ID Description OD ID Thickness/
Length
Mass
1 Large Washer 28.0 mm 6.7 mm 2.0 mm 8.6 g
2 Medium Washer 20.0 mm 10.5 mm 2.0 mm 3.1 g
3 Small Washer 15.0 mm 3.0 mm 2.0 mm 2.6 g
4 Large Nail 3.4 mm 78.0 mm 5.7 g
5 Small Nail 2.8 mm 58.0 mm 3.1 g
6 Wire 3.0 mm 100–150 mm 7.5 g
7 Medium Slug 24.0 mm 15.0 mm 55 g
8 Small Slug 16.0 mm 15.0 mm 21 g
9 Large Slug >30.0 mm 5–15 mm 36–382 g
Table 1. Characteristics of seeded ferrous debris.
ed debris was recovered on the first 
pass, and 34% (102 of 304) of the 
remaining debris was recovered on 
the second pass. The collection ef-
fectiveness decreased significantly 
to 8% (17 of 202) of the remain-
ing debris for the third pass. Figure 
11 (page 57) shows the percentage 
of available debris recovered dur-
ing each pass, separated by debris 
type. In general, a similar debris 
percentage was recovered on each 
pass, regardless of debris type.
In addition to the quantity of 
each debris type, the recovery lo-
cation (roller, sheet or catch) of the 
debris was also recorded and ana-
lyzed. Figure 12 (page 57) shows the 
breakdown of recovery location, 
separated by debris type. For the 
lighter types (washers, nails, wires), 
the roller collected the majority of the debris (50% on the roller, 26% on 
the upper catch and 24% on the sheet). However, for the larger, heavier 
debris types (medium and small slugs), the percentages shifted dramati-
cally with 34% collected on the roller, 65% on the upper catch and 2% on 
the sheet. One potential explanation for this difference is that a direct hit 
from one of the upward-swinging flail hammers could impart enough 
momentum to free a slug from the surrounding soil and send it to the up-
per catch, whereas the smaller debris types are less likely to encounter di-
rect hits from the flail hammers and are slowed more dramatically by the 
surrounding soil due to their shape and smaller inertia.
In general, all three components of the statistical test configuration 
contributed significantly to the overall recovery effectiveness, which 
suggests that placing magnets in multiple locations around the flail 
head yields higher collection percentages.
Following the completion of the statistical testing, a purely 
qualitative test was performed in a topsoil area contaminated with 
ferrous material adjacent to an industrial warehouse and machine 
shop. A section approximately 2 m in length was flailed to a depth of 
15 cm. As seen in Figure 13 (page 57), several handfuls of metal debris, 
ranging from small particles to large chunks, were collected. The result, 
while purely qualitative in nature, suggests that the configuration 
Table 2. Seeded debris in each 
test box (type and quantity).
ID Description Qty
1 Large Washer 12
2 Medium Washer 12
3 Small Washer 12
4 Large Nail 12
5 Small Nail 12
6 Wire 12
7 Medium Slug 6
8 Small Slug 2
Total 68
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Figure 8. Increased soil turbulence with magnetic roller in lowest position.
Figure 9. Optimal configuration of the magnetic collection system.
Figure 10. Statistical test run.
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Figure 12. Location of breakdown of collected debris.
Figure 13. Qualitative topsoil test and collected debris.
may be effective in soil conditions other than dry, loose sand. It also 
shows that magnets are effective at capturing ferrous debris covered 
with substantial oxidation and other surface contamination conditions 
likely to be found in the field.
Discussion
The testing showed that machine-integrated permanent magnets can 
be effective in collecting ferrous debris (during testing, more than 40% 
of seeded debris was collected on the first pass). Although the testing 
was conducted in dry, loose sand using seeded debris, the collection per-
centages are sufficiently high to suggest that 
machine-integrated magnets could dramati-
cally reduce the amount of ferrous material 
remaining in the field following flailing oper-
ations. Reducing the number of metal-detec-
tor indications during manual follow-up can 
significantly increase deminer speed, which 
improves the overall efficiency of clearance 
operations. The results also suggest that ma-
chine-integrated magnets can provide bene-
ficial data on minefield contamination when 
used during technical survey operations.
Soil/magnet contact. The testing showed 
that the action of the flail hammers tended 
to deposit metal debris in the loose soil be-
hind the flail and the majority of the debris 
remained below the surface of the flailed 
soil. Since permanent magnets do not typi-
cally have sufficient strength to pull material 
through a substantial amount of soil, magnet-
ic configurations passing over the top of the 
loose soil recover only a small fraction of the 
debris. Because of this, magnetic collectors 
pulled behind machines have very low effec-
tiveness. In order to increase collection ef-
fectiveness, raising the percentage of the soil 
that comes into direct contact with the mag-
netic surface is necessary. With the magnet 
geometries available during this test period, 
the most effective method involved placing 
the roller in its lowest position. The resulting 
configuration caused soil to flow over the roll-
er and dramatically increased the amount of 
soil thrown up toward the sheet and the upper 
catch, which substantially raised the percent-
age of soil and debris that came into direct 
contact with the magnetic surfaces. 
Debris removal. Once the debris ad-
hered to the magnets, removal was relatively 
time-consuming. The magnets did not in-
clude any provision for wholesale removal of 
the debris, so pieces were removed individu-
ally by hand. While this was acceptable for 
testing, during actual clearance operations 
in heavily contaminated areas, metal debris 
accumulation may be so rapid that the mag-
nets must be cleared at frequent intervals to 
the point where area processing speed would 
be adversely affected by time-consuming de-
bris removal.
Conclusion
The results of the testing suggest that machine-integrated permanent 
magnets can be effective at capturing ferrous debris during flailing op-
erations. However, after observing the movement of the debris-filled soil 
during testing, the test configuration could clearly be further optimized 
to improve debris collection. The flail shroud could be designed to ef-
ficiently guide the soil deposited behind the flail head to the magnetic 
collection area. A ramped surface immediately behind the flail head (in 
place of the roller) would allow soil to be thrown upward and funneled 
into channels, maximizing its exposure to magnetic surfaces. A larg-
er upper catch would further improve collection effectiveness. In addi-
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tion, any integrated magnetic collector must 
include provisions to easily clear debris from 
the collection surfaces.
Once the magnetic collection system 
is redesigned, additional testing in a con-
trolled environment (such as SWEDEC) and 
a representative field environment (such as an 
actual minefield or known battle area) is rec-
ommended. The focus for these tests should be
•	 To determine what impact ferrous de-
bris collection has on the efficiency of 
manual follow-up clearance
•	 To determine what impact ferrous de-
bris collection has on technical survey 
operations
•	 To develop operational procedures for 
working with a machine-integrated 
magnetic collector
With additional input from field testing, 
machine-integrated magnetic debris collec-
tion could dramatically speed up manual fol-
low-up activities and provide valuable data 
during technical survey operations. 
See endnotes page 67
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A Discrimination Method for 
 Landmines and Metal Fragments  
  Using Metal Detectors
While discrimination methods for distinguishing between real mines and metal fragments would greatly in-
crease the efficiency of demining operations, no practical solution has been implemented yet. A potentially 
efficient method for the discrimination of metallic targets using metal detectors uses a high-precision ro-
botic manipulator to scan the minefield. Further field research is needed, however, before this method can 
deploy for operational use.
by Alex M. Kaneko, Edwardo F. Fukushima and Gen Endo [ Tokyo Institute of Technology ]
Current detection and clearance methods suffer from high false-alarm rates (FAR) and are costly, dangerous and time consuming. In 2001, the Tokyo Institute of Technol-
ogy began work on a semi-autonomous mobile robot, the Gryphon 
(Figure 1), to facilitate the mine-detection process.1 The robot’s manipu-
lator is equipped with tools for cutting vegetation and uses mine sensors 
to scan rough terrain, record data and note suspect locations by marking 
the ground. During experiments in test fields of flat terrain with no veg-
etation, the Gryphon proved as efficient as human operators when us-
ing a mine detector based on electromagnetic induction, such as a metal 
mine detector (MMD).2 The Gryphon proved superior when compared 
to human operators in terms of reducing FAR and increasing probability 
of detection. However, similar to other demining solutions, FAR is still 
problematic with the Gryphon.
Problem Statement
One of the greatest problems in manual humanitarian landmine de-
tection and removal involves high FAR, which are inherent to the use 
of electromagnetic induction-based detectors. Currently, no commer-
cially available MMDs can distinguish landmines from other metal 
fragments. Some electromagnetic induction-based detectors, however, 
can select metal types to be searched, such as gold detectors.3 Similarly, 
MMDs can be used for the discrimination of landmines and other metal 
fragments, as shown by research in the following topics: 
1. Algorithms for evaluation of detected signals using models of 
physical phenomena4,5,6 
2. Feature extraction from MMD signals and classification of data 
according to metal type, size or depth of the metal fragments7,8,9
3. Algorithms that combine time domain analysis and frequency 
domain analysis10,11 
Some methods also rely on a dual-sensor approach, which combines 
two sensors and an MMD with ground-penetrating radar (GPR).12,13 
However, a high level of expertise is still needed to properly evaluate the 
obtained data (image or sound). Moreover, discrimination has a large 
safety margin, which keeps FAR high. Another interesting method that 
has been reported uses image processing, MMD-signal surface area and 
volume calculation to estimate size and material, followed by depth es-
timation, which is achieved by placing the MMD at different angles.9 
Despite reducing FAR to 39%, this method requires too much addition-
al information from several depths (layers) besides the standard scan 
for discrimination, which considerably slows the demining operation by 
many minutes.8
Unfortunately, these methods have yet to be successfully implement-
ed for use in practical demining tasks. Here, preliminary research on 
a potentially faster, newer, more accurate, on-site method (no need for 
additional scans) for discrimination of metallic targets using metal de-
tectors is presented, and takes advantage of high-precision scans of the 
minefield using a robotic manipulator as shown in Figure 1. 
Robotic Scanning and Sensor Data 
The usual scanning procedure consists of manually swinging the 
MMD sideways while advancing the search head in increments between 
one scan and another. A robotic arm, which achieves higher precision 
and repeatability, can conduct a similar procedure. For a human de-
miner, the MMD signals (called V[%] here) are transformed into sound, 
and the deminer must remember and search the position of the ground 

































Figure 1. The demining robot Gryphon and its metal mine-detector 
signal visualization.
All figures courtesy of the authors.
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computer and easily associated with the location of the manipulator. The 
signal can be processed in real time, and the user can easily visualize it 
(Figure 1). For the Gryphon system, the target position can be marked di-
rectly on the ground by painting or placing colored markers on the spot.14
SRMMDS uniqueness. Figure 2 shows a 3-D plot of the MMD 
signal, also known as a spatially represented metal mine-detector signal 
(SRMMDS). SRMMDS drastically changes according to postures and 
target types. Depending on the target, SRMMDS will present different 
characteristics, which can include physical properties such as depth, 
material, posture, shape, size and soil conditions. This implies that if 
a database of SRMMDS for every target in every condition could be 
prebuilt, one would only need to compare the SRMMDS obtained in 
the minefield to get the closest match in the database, which would 
identify the target, as well as the target’s depth and posture. Even 
though some metal detectors can discriminate metal types, this feature 
is explored differently in this research.3 Different metal types generate 
positive or negative SRMMDS, suggesting the type of metal. However, 
the combined characteristics that compose the detected SRMMDS are 
fundamental for identification in this research, features such as the 
depth, material, posture, shape, size and soil conditions. Although 
previous works used databases, this research has a different approach in 
which a high-precision robotic arm obtains SRMMDS. Simplified, only 
the necessary parts of the whole SRMMDS are stored in the database 
using simple yet powerful mathematical relations.7,8
SRMMDS simplification. In Figure 3, θ is defined as x’y’z’, the local 
coordinate for SRMMDS. While the x’y’ plane parallels the MMD scan-
ning plane, the z’-axis passes through the maximum absolute point of 
the SRMMDS. The plane Pθ is orthogonal to the x’y’ plane and passes 
through the z’-axis at an angle θ relative to the x’-axis. The intersection 
of plane Pθ and the SRMMDS contour generates a new curve, which is 
a characteristic curve known as V(r(θ)) (Figure 3) that is referenced to 
the new axis r(θ) and defined by the intersection of planes Pθ and x’y’. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the characteristic curves of physically 
symmetric targets such as anti-tank (AT) mines are the same for any 
angle θ, while curves for nonsymmetric targets change drastically. This 
analysis suggests that SRMMDS can be simplified to a set with a mini-
mum number of characteristic curves. For symmetric cases, one charac-
teristic curve would be enough, but this is not obvious for nonsymmetric 
cases. For the nonsymmetric targets (shown in Figure 2), a characteristic 
curve for the target’s longest length of direction presents many inflec-
tions and peaks when compared to other angles. This research defines 
the characteristic curve with most inflections and peaks as the main 
characteristic curve and its axis r(θ) as the main axis. Figure 4 shows 
some examples of main characteristic curves.
Polynomial Characterization
Characteristic curves can be represented by splines, polynomials or 
other mathematical relations in the form of V = f(r(θ)). As the number 
of inflections for the characteristic curves is limited, the authors pro-
pose polynomials in the form of Equation 1. This method has the advan-
tage of keeping the signal characteristics and filtering part of the noisy 
raw data at the same time. In this work, all signals are translated with 
maximum peak in r = 0, making a0 the maximum absolute MMD value 
of the signal. 
Equation 1: f(Y) = a0r(θ)
0 + a1r(θ)
1 + a2r(θ)
2 + … + anr(θ)
n
Where a0, a1, a2,..., a
n are polynomial coefficients
In this research, the integral of the polynomials’ difference (Equa-
tion 2) is adopted as the measure of error (Err [%])—i.e., similarity—
between characteristic curves, which will serve as the main criteria for 
discrimination.
Equation 2: Err = ∫| f – g|/h*100
Where f and g are polynomials to be compared
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Figure 3. Cutting plane using as example the obtained signal of an anti-
tank mine.





























The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol18/iss1/1 1
JOURNAL: The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Issue 8.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Comm ns, 2014



























The basic scheme for discrimination of sensed signals can be imple-
mented as follows:
•	 Step 1: Calculate the Err (Equation 2) for the characteristic curve 
of the sensed signal against all data in the prebuilt database.
•	 Step 2: Select the data with minimum Err as candidate for dis-
crimination.
This scheme can result in four possible cases, namely R1, R2, R3 or 
R4, as shown in Table 1(a) and illustrated in Figure 5. Cases R1 and R4 
result in correct discrimination. Although R2 results in a false positive 
and thus increases FAR, it is still acceptable. However, case R3 finds 
metal fragment data as the closest match for a landmine-obtained sig-
nal, causing a false negative result (mine judged as a metal fragment), 
which is unacceptable in this or any other demining research.
In this research, a false negative can be overcome by flagging as po-
tential mines all metal fragment data that can cause case R3, resulting in 
a new case R3’, as shown in Table 1(b). The identification of R3 and the 
R3’ flagging are conducted during the database building and condition-
ing process, as explained in the database section. 
Practical Discrimination Process
Measure of difference of errors (dE). In Figure 5, the Err of some 
metal fragment data is close to mines, as in the R1 example. To prevent 
any misjudgments in a real situation, Equation 3 calculates a measure of 
difference of errors (dE), which is the difference between the Err of the 
closest metal fragment (Err(closest MF)) and the Err of the closest landmine 
(Err(closest landmine)).
Equation 3: dE = Err (closest MF) – Err (closest landmine) 
A threshold for dE, dEthreshold, is also defined for flagging all metal 
fragments in which |dE| < dEthreshold as potential mines, thereby reduc-
ing the chance that landmines are discriminated as metal fragments.
Measure of confidence (Ethreshold). Another case that can be ob-
served in Figure 5 involves the Err of the closest target (called Eclosest) 
that sometimes can be too high, which indicates no matches in the data-
base. This can mean that the data contains too much noise or the target 
is degraded, making it a potential risk. In this research, a safety criteri-
on labels the test subject as a potential mine when Eclosest is greater than 
a given threshold, Ethreshold, to be determined by experiments. Figure 6 
shows some examples of metal fragments similar to landmines.
Discrimination steps. The final scheme for discriminating sensed 
signals, while taking into account the above measures, is implemented 
as follows:
•	 Step 1: Calculate the Err of the obtained signal (sensed signal) 
against all available data in the database.
•	 Step 2: Select the data with minimum Err, i.e., Eclosest.
 » If Eclosest ≥ Ethreshold, consider the sensed signal as a poten-
tial mine and end discrimination.
•	 Step 3: Calculate the measure of difference of errors (dE), and 
make the final decision.
 » If dE > 0, the sensed signal is considered a mine. If dE < 0 
and |dE| > dEthreshold, the sensed signal is considered a metal 
fragment. Otherwise, the sensed signal is considered a po-
tential mine.
Database-building Experiment
In order to verify the proposed method’s validity, a database of char-
acteristic curves (represented by polynomials) was built for multiple 
targets, depths and postures using a robotic manipulator. The data was 
taken with a metal mine-detector head at a linear speed of 50 mm/s, with 
a 10-mm depth step, 10-mm line step between scan lines and a signal 
output density of 0.2 points/mm. For the following analysis, data with 
weak signals (V(%) < 1%) and saturated signals (V(%) = 100%) were re-
moved from the database.
Metal detector signal conditioning. The Minelab F3 Metal Mine De-
tector was chosen for this experiment.15 This detector outputs signals in 
two independent channels (called ChA and ChB here), which are com-
bined according to Equation 4 and detailed in endnote 16.16 ChC is used 
to derive characteristic curve V(r(θ)  for comparison in Equation 2.
Equation 4: ChC = ChB – ChA – median (ChB – ChA) (4)
Targets description. Figure 7 and Table 3 (page 62) show target types 
and testing conditions. A total of 42 different targets (11 landmines 
and 31 metal fragments) consisting of different shapes (cubes, cylin-
ders, spheres, tubes) and materials (aluminum, brass, chrome, stain-
less, steel), with depths varying from 10 mm to 400 mm, and different 
Case Test Subject Closest Match Discrimination Result
R1 Metal fragment Metal fragment True negative Good: decrease FAR
R2 Metal fragment Mine False positive Still acceptable: increase FAR
R3 Mine Metal fragment False negative Not acceptable: a missed mine
R4 Mine Mine True positive Good: increase probability of 
detection




Table 1.a and b. Basic discrimination cases according to Err (%). b. After 
the database conditioning process, case R3 becomes R3’. 
Table courtesy of authors/CISR.








































































Figure 6. Examples of metal fragments considered potential mines by the 
Eclosest and |dE| < dEthreshold  criteria. Targets and corresponding depths 
are shown in parenthesis. Note that the International Test Operations Pro-
cedures (ITOP) conceived for an ITOP project as the metal content of larg-
er stimulant mines shows SRMMDS very similar to the PMN2 mine and 
it is also classified as a potential mine by this criteria.
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postures (horizontal, inclined 45˚ and vertical) were tested, which re-
sulted in a total of 362 different data entries into the database. To be 
more applicable in an operational setting, future research efforts will in-
crease the data library to include a range of minimum metal mines and 
small minefield fragments.
Database integrity and measure of confidence setting. For each giv-
en data N in the database (Table 3, N = 1 to 362), consider N as a test 
subject and calculate the Err (Equation 2) against all other data in the 
database. The cases (R1, R2, R3 and R4) described earlier are analyzed 
and shown (sorted for easier visualization) in Figure 8.
To determine Ethreshold, several values from 0 to 100% were set, and 
corresponding values for false positives and true positives were ob-
served. As Figure 9 (page 63) shows, Ethreshold = 10% is the value that 
maximizes the difference between true positives and false positives.
Expanding Database Capabilities:  
Data Interpolation for Different Depths
Preparing a database containing information for every depth and 
posture may be infeasible in reality. Fortunately, a given target’s char-
acteristic curves basically keep the same level of concavity and main-
ly change in amplitude (a0) for different depths, as Figure 10 (page 63)
shows. For each value of r(m), MMD signals for the main characteristic 
curves of each depth have a quadratic relation. For example, if the input 
a0 is 80%, the estimated depth is around 160 mm for the AT mine and 80 
mm for metal fragment 21. This strong relation between depth and sig-
nal intensities suggests that we can estimate characteristic curves from a 
desired depth or vice versa by interpolation (represented in red). In this 
work, a0 is used as input for interpolation, which generates a depth and a 
main characteristic curve for each target and is used for comparison in 
Equation 2. The data with Eclosest is then output, providing suggestions 
for depth, material, posture and target type.17
Repeating the analysis necessary to measure confidence setting 
with the interpolation method, smaller values of Err are obtained. In 
the new threshold, Ethreshold equals 15% (Figure 11, page 63), and R1, 
R2, R3 and R4 cases are set. Since no extrapolation is done in the inter-
polation, part of the data (each target’s deepest and shallowest data) is 
not used. Since depth errors are possible, depth-error margins are also 
considered; Figure 12  (page 63)shows the analyzed trade-off.17 For in-
terpolated cases, FAR levels are much lower when compared to the Dis-
crete Data 10 mm case.
Figure 12 shows a FAR analysis conducted in a laboratory with the 
data from the database. Since potential mines were flagged with the cri-
Table 2. Discrimination cases: For all the above cases when Eclosest >_
Ethreshold, test subject shall be considered a potential mine.
Table courtesy of authors/CISR.





R1 Metal fragment Metal fragment dE < 0, |dE| >
dEthreshold
True negative
R1’ Metal fragment Metal fragment
fl agged as
“potential mine”
dE < 0, |dE| ≤
dEthreshold
False positive
R2 Metal fragment Mine dE > 0 False positive
R3’ Mine Metal fragment
fl agged as
“potential mine”
dE < 0 True positive



























7-27 mm diameter, 
27-114 mm height Steel 45° in xz
223-254 Cube 20 mm edge Aluminum, stainless, 
brass
Horizontal







diameter, 0.5 mm 





292-301 Sphere 25.4 mm diameter Chrome Horizontal
302-305 ITOP
4.8 mm outer 
diameter, 0.5 mm 











306-330 AT 300 mm diameter Steel Horizontal
331-335 PMN 112 mm diameter
56 mm height
Mixture of small 
alloys
Horizontal










and 45° in xz)
Table 3. Dimensions of the targets used for building the database.
Table courtesy of authors/CISR.
Figure 7. Targets used for building the database.
Figure 8. Resulting errors of closest metal fragments and mines from 
each data. According to the adopted safety margins dEthreshold and 
Ethreshold different FAR can be observed.
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teria shown in the above section on discrimination, Figure 12 shows all 
cases in which false negatives do not occur, even if dEthreshold = 0. How-
ever, in real demining operations, dEthreshold = 0 is unacceptable, and a 
convenient safety margin must be set. In Figure 6 (page 61), an Interna-
tional Test Operation Procedures (ITOP) target resembles a PMN2 mine, 
and it is considered a potential mine in the discrete case in which |dE| < 
dEthreshold criterion when dEthreshold ≥ 10%. Therefore, dEthreshold = 10% is 
adopted. For interpolated cases, Equation 2 identifies an ITOP target as 
a potential mine. While dEthreshold = 0 would be enough, a minimum of 
dEthreshold = 5% is adopted. Moreover, since the maximum depth-estima-
tion error of this method is 40 mm, this depth margin is adopted in real 
operations.17
Experimental Results
In this section, data taken in 2007 is used at a test field in Croatia.2 
The Gryphon robot conducted this test. The test scanned uneven lanes of 
different soil properties, where several metal fragments and ITOP con-
taining landmine surrogates were buried in random positions at depths 
between 1 and 14.5 cm. Among the six lanes and 38 targets per lane (180 
data points in total, of which 120 were ITOP), 14 ITOP containing land-
mine surrogates and 14 metal fragments (bullets, rockets, etc.) were cho-
sen to be applied as input in the proposed discrimination method. The 
data was chosen so that no other metal fragments were nearby, and the 
position was located within a standard scan area (2 sq m) to avoid cutting 
data. Table 4 (page 64) shows the safety margins and results.
The adopted safety margins guarantee correct detection of all ITOP 
targets as potential mines. In the laboratory, all ITOP data (in discrete 
and interpolated cases) are the closest targets to metal fragment 10 (car-
tridge shown in Figure 7 and Table 3, page 62). In this experiment with 
ITOP data from the test field, six of the 14 instances for discrete cases and 
12 of the 14 for interpolated cases designated metal fragment 10 as the 
Figure 9. Variation of false-positive and true-positive values according 
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Figure 11. Variation of false-positive and true-positive values ac-











True Positive - False Positive
Figure 10. Example of polynomial interpolation for an AT target type MF21 
target type. Strong relation between depths and MMD signals permit 
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Figure 12. Trade-off of adopted safety margins and FAR. For all cases, 
FAR is generated with no occurrence of false negatives due to the dis-




















Error = 0.74% Error = 0.43%
Figure 13. FAR examples: Fragment discriminated as potential mine (left) 
and fragment discriminated as landmine (right). Each target’s depth is 
shown in parenthesis. MFX and MFY are two metal fragments from the 
test field, of which size, shape and material are unavailable.
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closest target using direct search with Equa-
tion 2, which was consistent in the laboratory 
environment. The ITOP in the upright posi-
tion in the database (not buried in the labo-
ratory environment) and the safety margin 
criteria are valid for correct discrimination of 
data obtained with the Gryphon in soil.
A large number of the metal fragments 
were discriminated as potential mines in the 
discrete case due to the Ethreshold criterion, 
which indicates no similar targets exist in the 
database. This experiment detected eight out 
of 14 instances for discrete cases and five out of 
14 metal fragments for interpolated cases. Due 
to the method’s adopted safety precautions, 
these results were expected. Adding similar 
target information to the database would re-
sult in more accurate discrimination. 
Based on their proximity to some land-
mines, two of the 14 metal fragments were 
considered potential mines by dEthreshold cri-
terion. Without available information on the 
test field’s metal fragment material, shape or 
size, they will be known as metal fragment X 
(MFX) and metal fragment Y (MFY). In in-
terpolated cases, MFX was considered a po-
tential mine for being too similar to the metal 
fragment 13 cartridge (Figure 7 and Table 3, 
page 62) and was also considered a potential 
mine for being too similar to the PMN2 land-
mine (Figure 13, page 63). MFY was identi-
fied as a landmine by direct search, in which a 
PMN2 was identified as the closest data match 
(Figure 13, page 63). 
The better performance of the interpolat-
ed method generates lower FAR levels. Time is 
another great advantage of using this method; 
it takes one second per target, which is faster 
than the false-alarm reduction method end-
note 9 references, which takes more than 96 
seconds per target.9
Conclusions
The above tests of this new methodology 
for the discrimination of landmines and met-
al fragments using commercially available 
MMDs and a prebuilt library demonstrate 
that this methodology can lead to effective 
signal characterization and real-time dis-
crimination. Moreover, the methodology to 
Discrete Interpolated
Ethreshold (%) 10 15
dEthreshold (%) 10 5
Depth margin (mm) 40 40
Metal fragments discriminated as 
“potential mines” according to 
Ethreshold criterion
8/14 5/14
Metal fragments discriminated as 
“potential mines” according to 
dEthreshold criterion
5/14 1/14
Metal fragments discriminated as 
landmines by closest data in data-
base
0/14 1/14
FAR (%) 13/14 = 92% 7/14 = 50%
ITOPs discriminated as 
“potential mines” according to 
Ethreshold criterion
3/14 0/14
ITOPs discriminated as 
“potential mines” according to 
dEthreshold criterion
9/14 13/14
ITOPs discriminated as ITOP 
itself in vertical posture by 
closest data in database
1/14 1/14
Discriminated as landmine by 
closest data in database
1/14 0/14
False negatives 0/14 0/14
Time for discrimination/target (s) < 1 < 1
Table 4. Parameters adopted and results of the proposed method.
Table courtesy of authors/CISR.
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interpolate discrete data into the database ac-
cording to its depth makes the evaluation of 
data in arbitrary depths possible. False posi-
tives, which increase FAR, depend on the ad-
opted error-margin criteria. After extensive 
laboratory tests, thresholds of Ethreshold (%) 
= 15% and dEthreshold (%) = 5% were selected, 
which reduces the FAR to about 50%.
Results from the data analysis obtained in a 
Croatian test field in 2007 showed the robust-
ness, validity and potential of the proposed 
method for practical applications. This tech-
nology could also potentially help detect un-
exploded ordnance (UXO) as well. However, 
additional testing with real UXO and mines, 
especially low-metal mines, will be needed if 
that application is pursued. Further tests in 
real minefields are in development as the next 
step in this work. This includes tests scheduled 
for 2014 in Angola that will investigate more 
types of landmines and metal fragments, as 
well as other important factors such as soil and 
climate. 
JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25303012 
supported this work.
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